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I would like to point out that in reality the replacement of
court adjudication by a five member panel of experts in inter-
national trade law may very well reduce the amount of defer-
ence to the Department in the future... Apparently each
government felt that this system was more satisfactory than
the one which was replaced.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly five years ago the United States and Canada en-
tered into the landmark trade agreement known as the Cana-
da-United States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA).2 The CFTA
and each country's respective implementing legislation and
regulations established a functioning series of binational pan-
els to review and adjudicate specific trade disputes arising out
of the respective nation's local antidumping and countervailing
duty laws.' These binational panels fully supplanted judicial
review both in Canada and the United States for eligible deter-
minations for which such review is requested.4 Effective Janu-
ary 1, 1994, the former CFTA provisions relating to binational
* The authors of this article are Robert E. Burke and Brian F. Walsh, at-
torneys with the firm of Barnes, Richardson & Colburn. Mr. Burke and Mr. Walsh
have appeared as counsel, both on briefs and at oral argument, in several bina-
tional panel proceedings. Neither author has sought to be included among the
Article 1904 list of panelist candidates. The authors offer these views in an ear-
nest effort to advance the interest of all private parties appearing before panels,
including domestic and foreign producers, distributors and importers.
1. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-
01 USA, at 28 (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding, Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey,
J., dissenting) (unpublished).
2. Dec. 22, 1987 - Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281.
3. Id. chap. 19; see also, United States and Canada Free-Trade Agreement
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851, 1879-1898 (1988)
(amending 19 U.S.C. 1516(a) (1988)).
4. CFTA, supra note 2, art. 1904(1).
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panel review were rolled into the new North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)5 with some modifications.
The purpose of this article is to comment on the serious
question as to whether the panel system has met the expecta-
tions of the trading partners, of private businesses that are
bound by the procedures and determinations of the panels, and
of practitioners appearing before the panels.
In 1988, the Court of International Trade Bar Association
(CITBA) expressed its view, both in writing and at testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, that serious and fun-
damental issues existed relating to whether the panel system
should be adopted and, if so, how it should be implemented.6
The experience of the past five years has borne out the legiti-
mate concerns of the CITBA. While the authors are not in any
way representing the CITBA in this article, it is our belief that
the endemic problems and difficulties predicted by the CITBA
have, in fact, been borne out in actual practice.
The following article attempts to survey the pros and cons
of the panel system and presents ultimate recommendations
relative to the continuation of that system.
II. BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW-SHOULD IT BE CONTINUED?
A. Points in Favor of Continuation of Panel Review
1. Expeditious Review
One of the primary benefits of panel review under the
CFTA is expeditious review. The CFTA established specific
time limits to which all parties and panel members were re-
quired to adhere. These time limits, which were adopted in
NAFTA,7 include the following:
(1) Notice of intent to commence judicial review must be
filed within 20 days of the final determination to be challenged;8
5. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Cana-
da, the Government of the United Mexican States, and the Government of the
United States of America, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
6. United States - Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. of the Judicary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational Panel
to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 163 [hereinafter CITBA Statement].
7. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1904(14).
8. Rules of Procedure for the North American Free Trade Agreement: Article
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(2) Complaints must be filed within 30 days of the filing
of a first request for panel review;9
(3) Notices of appearance for those parties who chose to
participate, but who do not file a complaint, must be filed
within 45 days of the filing of the first request for panel re-
view;10
(4) Complainants must file briefs within 60 days after
the deadline for the filing of the administrative record;11
(5) Parties responding to complainant's briefs must file
such briefs within 60 days of the expiration of the time with-
in which complainant's briefs must be filed;
12
(6) Reply brief may be fled within 15 days of the expira-
tion of the time within which response briefs must be filed; 3
(7) Oral argument shall commence no later than 30 days
after the filing of reply briefs;
14
(8) The panel shall issue its decision within 90 days of
the completion of oral argument. 5
Despite the fact that these time limits generously provide
a sixty day briefing period for parties, the deadlines mandate
the issuance of final decisions within 315 days from the filing
of a request for panel review. 6 Most innovative among the
deadlines at the time of the establishment of the panel system
were the requirement that oral argument be held within thirty
days of the filing of the briefs and the requirement that the
panels issue their opinions within ninety days of oral argu-
ment. Thus, protracted delays which can occur when such
cases are judicially reviewed are eliminated.'
It should be noted, however, that the advantages of the
above-cited time limits as compared to the procedures of the
1904 Panel Rules, Rule 33, NORTH AMERIcAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS--DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 15 (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds., Oceana Publications
Booklet A.6, Release 94-1, Feb. 1994) [hereinafter Article 1904 Panel Rules].
9. Id. Rule 39, at 18.
10. Id. Rule 40, at 19.
11. Id. Rule 57, at 27.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id. Rule 67, at 32.
15. Id. Rule 72, at 33.
16. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1904(14).
17. See Leonard M. Shambon, Accomplishing the Legislative Goals for the
Court of International Trade: More Speed! More Speed! (Nov. 3, 1989) (paper pre-
sented at the Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of International Trade (1989)).
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Court of International Trade (CIT) have been significantly
undercut as a result of changes which have been made to the
Rules of the Court of International Trade. Rule 56.2 of the
Rules of The Court of International Trade, which became effec-
tive on January 1, 1993, incorporates into the CIT rules time
limits similar to many of the time limits established in the
CFTA and continued in NAFTA. While, of course, no time limit
has been imposed on a judge's consideration of a matter, oral
argument, if requested, is to be held not more than thirty days
after the close of the briefing schedule, proposed judicial pro-
tective orders and motions to enjoin liquidation must be filed
within thirty days of the service of the complaint. Rule 56.2
also provides for detailed judicial management of the progress
of a matter, including the issuance of briefing schedules and
the required filing of status reports with the court.
Also tending to undercut the speed advantage which pan-
els may have over the court is the fact that panels do not have
the authority to reverse agency decisions but may only uphold
a final determination or "remand it for action not inconsistent
with the panel's decision." Thus, time consuming remands are
to be expected and multiple remands are not unusual. As of
the fall of 1993 the record stood as follows:
CFTA panels have remanded to the agency in nine of the
twenty-one cases they have decided. Five of the nine have
involved multiple remands. In those cases the elapsed time
from request for a panel to a final decision was not the 315
days established in the CFTA, but ranged from 383 to 927
days. The longest-927 days-involved three remands. "
The most significant method by which the panel system
has decreased the time spent pursuing a final decision is the
fact that no right of appeal exists with regard to panel deci-
sions. 9 Thus, with the exception of those few issues which
may be the subject of review by an extraordinary challenge
committee (ECC), review of disputes ends with the issuance of
the panel's decision less than a year (at least in cases involving
no remands) after the filing of the request for panel review in
the matter.
18. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA. Binational Panels as the
Trade Court of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAW. 707, 718 (1993).
19. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1904(11).
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2. Consideration by a Panel in the First Instance of Review
A review of the decisions issued by the panels makes it
apparent that, in most cases, the panels have conscientiously
attempted to address all of the issues placed before them. The
decisions issued by the panels are often voluminous and often
contain thorough discussions of the legal issues which have
been presented to the panel. It may be that some benefit is de-
rived from the fact that issues are reviewed, in the first in-
stance, by a panel rather than by a single individual. It may
also be that the practice experience of the panel members and
their interest in the area of international trade law serves
panel members well. Several commentators have noted the
high quality of panel decisions."
3. Simplification of Procedures
The CFTA Rules of Procedure incorporated a number of
innovative procedural simplifications which have been pre-
served in NAFTA. As stated above, in some respects the Court
of International Trade has taken similar steps.
Parties wishing to participate in panel review of a given
determination need 'not file a motion for intervention or an
answer. Rather, the Rules of Procedure simply provide for the
filing of a Notice of Appearance by interested parties.2 The
recent amendment of the Rules of the Court of International
Trade also eliminated the requirement for an answer for ac-
tions described in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).22
Further, antidumping or countervailing duty determina-
tions may result in only one proceeding before a panel."
Thus, for instance, in a case where a Canadian exporter wishes
20. Judith H. Bello et al., U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 18: Midterm
Report on Binational Dispute Settlement Under the United States-Canada Free-
Trade Agreements, 25 INT'L LAW. 489, 516 (1991); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Bination-
al Dispute Settlement under Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 269 (1991); Moyer,
supra note 18, at 722.
21. Article 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 3, Rule 40, at 19.
22. R. U.S. CT. INT'L TRADE 7.
23. James R. Cannon, International Trade Disputes - Non-Judicial Remedies
or Judicial Review: What Do You Get? What Do You Give Up?, Remarks Before
the Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of International Trade, (Oct. 15, 1990), in 137 F.R.D. 509, 615.
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to challenge a determination issued by the Department of
Commerce and a domestic party wishes to challenge certain
aspects of the determination, but also support the aspects of
the determination challenged by the foreign exporter, all issues
can be dealt with in one panel proceeding. It is not necessary
for the Canadian exporter and the domestic party to bring
separate panel actions.24
As a result of the fact that panels are not courts and have
no equitable powers, it was necessary when developing the
panel system under the CFTA to provide for a method by
which the liquidation of entries subject to a case would be
suspendedY 19 U.S.C. § 1516a was amended to require the
Department of Commerce to order the continued suspension of
liquidation of entries covered by a determination which was
the subject of panel review. Such suspension is automatic and
the provision was drafted with the intention of reflecting the
court's willingness to grant injunctions suspending liquidation
with regard to annual reviews of antidumping duty orders
but not with regard to challenges regarding initial investiga-
tions. As a result, no motion to suspend liquidation is neces-
sary in cases before a panel.
4. Necessary for CFTA and NAFTA
The final and most compelling point in favor of the contin-
ued existence of the panels is the fact that they were necessary
components of the CFTA and NAFTA: since Canada and Mexi-
co would not have become parties to these trade agreements
without the inclusion of these dispute settlement procedures, a
powerful incentive was provided for the establishment of the
panels and, presently, for their continuance. The economic
benefits which have been received and which are expected to
be received by the United States under these agreements are
substantial. As a quid pro quo for receiving these benefits and
24. See Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment
from Canada, No. USA 89-1904-03, (Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding
Motions to Dismiss Reviews), NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMVENTS-UNITED
STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: BINATIONAL PANEL DECISIONS AND RE-
PORTS (Oceana Publications, Release 92-1, June 1992) (Mar. 7, 1990).
25. See Cannon, supra note 23, at 13-15.
26. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983).




for the completion of these agreements, the panel system of
review was first established under the CFTA and has been
continued under NAFTA.
B. Points Opposed to Continuation of Panel Review
1. A Fundamental Existential Conflict
Article 1904(3) of the CFTA requires panels to "apply the
standard of review described in Article 1911 and the general
legal principles that a court of the importing country would
apply to a review of a determination of the competent investi-
gating authority."28 Article 1904 of NAFTA states:
The panel will apply the standard of review for the importing
party established in Annex 1911 (country specific definitions)
and legal principles applied by a court of the importing Party
to such a review.29
The legislative history of both the CFTA and NAFTA are re-
plpte with statements that panels should not restrict the right
of an industry to seek redress from unfair trading practices:
Nothing in Article 1904 or any other provision of Chapter
Nineteen restricts in any way the right of a domestic indus-
try to seek redress from unfair trading practices through
national AD [antidumping] and CVD [countervailing duty]
laws. o
28. Article 1911 of NAFTA refers to Annex 1911 for definitions of the relevant
standards of review. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1911. Annex 1911 instructs
that panels must apply the standard of review contained in 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(b)(1)(B). Further, Article 1911 defines "general legal principles" to be "prin-
ciples such as standing, due process, rules of statutory construction, mootness, and
exhaustion of legal remedies." Id. art. 1911.
29. Annex 1911 defines the standard of review, in the case of the United
states as follows:
(i) the standard set out in section 516A(b)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, with the exception of a determination referred to in
(ii), and
(ii) the standard set out in section 516A(b)(1)(A) of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended, with respect to a determination by the United
States International Trade Commission not to initiate a review pursuant
to section 751(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended ....
Id., annex 1911.
30. Statement of Administrative Action, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREE-
idENTS-TREATY MATERIALS 177 (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds.,
Oceana Publications Booklet 8, Release 94-1, Feb. 1994).
1995] 535
BROOK. J. INTL L.
The legislative history makes clear that the standard of review
to be applied by the panels is the same standard of review as
that to be applied by United States courts. The legislative his-
tory also shows that the panels are to review the matters with-
in their jurisdiction "precisely" as would a court in the United
States: -
For example, the participation of panelists with judicial expe-
rience would help to ensure that, in accordance with the
requirement of Article 1904, panels review determinations of
the administering authorities precisely as would a court of
the importing country by applying exclusively that country's
AD and CVD law and its standard of review. 1
The importance of these principles to the panel system
was expressed in the Senate Joint Report on NAFTA which
stated "that the NAFTA, just as the CFTA, requires binational
panels to apply the same standards of review and general legal
principles that domestic courts would apply. This requirement
is the foundation of the binational panel system .... [F]ailure
to apply the appropriate standard of review, potentially under-
mine[es] the integrity of the binational panel process."32
The Senate further elaborated its expectations as follows:
It is the Committee's expectation that, in the future, bina-
tional panels will properly apply U.S. law and the appropri-
ate standard of review, giving broad deference to the deci-
sions of both the Department of Commerce and the
ITC .... [Elxtraordinary challenge procedures may be in-
yoked where a panel has manifestly exceeded its powers,
authority or jurisdiction by failing, for example, to apply the
appropriate standard of review, where such action has mate-
rially affected the panel's decision and threatens the integrity
of the binational panel process. Because the central tenet of
Chapter 19 is that a panel must operate precisely as would
the court it replaces, the Committee believes that misapplica-
tion of U.S.'law in important areas is a clear threat to the
integrity of the Chapter 19 process.33
31. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
32. SENATE JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, NORTH AMERIcAN FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT, S. REP. No. 183, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1993).
33. Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).
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Finally, the ECC opinion in the Live Swine case stated:
Panels must follow and apply the law, not create it. Although
panels substitute for the Court of International Trade in
reviewing Commerce's determinations, they are not appellate
courts. Because the Committee's scope of review is so limited,
most panel decisions will never be reviewed. Panels must
understand their limited role and simply apply established
law. Panels must be mindful of changes in the law, but not
create them. Panels may not articulate the prevailing law
and then depart from it in a clandestine attempt to change
the law. (citations omitted). 4
Given the fact that panels are to apply the principles of
United States law in the manner in which a court in the Unit-
ed States would apply such principles, the question which
must be asked is "what is the reason for the existence of the
panel system?" It is clear, as discussed above, that the panel
system may, in many cases, offer the benefit of speed over
judicial review and that the panel rules of procedures offer
some innovations. Were these the sole reasons for the estab-
lishment of the panel system? If speed and innovative proce-
dures were the goals, then it was not necessary to include
Canadians on the panels reviewing decisions of United States
government agencies in the case of the CFTA or Canadians
and Mexicans on panels in the case of NAFTA. Dissatisfaction
with judicial review of another sort appears to have also been
a motivation behind the establishment of the system. The re-
cent Softwood Lumber5 ECC opinion makes formal and ex-
plicit what had previously been unstated 6 by the panels and
34. In re Live Swine from Canada, No. ECC-93-1904-01 USA NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTs-DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (James R. Holbein & Donald
J. Musch eds., Oceana Publications Booklet Series No. B.13C, Release 93-2, Nov.
1993) (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding, Apr. 8, 1993).
35. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-
01 USA, (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding, August 3, 1994).
36. Other commentators, however, have expressed this view. For instance:
There is one other factor to keep in mind in assessing the validity of the
panel review procedures. This is not a case where the elimination of
judicial review was primarily intended to benefit the parties by speeding
up the process . . . there is little doubt that the driving force behind the
change was the Canadian dissatisfaction with the outcome of the proceed-
ings in the United States, even after judicial review was completed. In
1995] 537
538 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XX:3
ECCs. Thus, in Softwood Lumber, Justice Gordon L.S. Hart,
writing for the majority stated:
I would like to point out that in reality the replacement of
court adjudication by a five-member panel of experts in inter-
national trade law may very well reduce the amount of defer-
ence to the Department in the future. When the Court of
International Trade reviews the determinations of Commerce,
it would be expected to bow to the expertise within the De-
partment. When the parties to the FTA agreed to replace
that court with this type of panel they must have realized
and intended that a review of the actions of Commerce or of
the Canadian agency would be more intense. The panels have
other words, when the parties were unwilling or unable to negotiate
substantive changes in the United States law, they created bilateral pan-
els to do indirectly that which they could not, or would not, do directly.
Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution Pro-
visions of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1279, 1307 (1992).
Though congressional approval has quelled the policy controversy, hidden
in the constitutional question is distrust over a perceived protectionist
bias of the International Trade Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in their present judicial review function. Some of the
fears of the Canadians and United States free traders are well-known in
the subsidy and dumping cases, and judicial review of agency orders in
the United States has gone both ways. Nonetheless, for as much disinter-
estedness and impartiality in reviewing orders as possible under the
FTA, including as much insulation as possible from unilateral statutory
changes, the Canadians insisted and the United States negotiators agreed
to Party election to have binding review of these orders in a binational
forum outside domestic judicial control.
Gordon A. Christenson & Kimberly Gambrel, Constitutionality of Binational Panel
Review in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 23 INTL LAW. 400, 402 (1989).
The Canadian business community perceived that relief available to U.S.
producers under U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws posed a
major obstacle to a stable economic environment. Recent growth in trade
law actions against Canadian exporters heightened this concern. Canadian
business managers claimed that unpredictable application of AD and CVD
laws significantly deterred them from exporting their goods to the United
States. To avoid AD and CVD actions, Canadian firms selling in the U.S.
market had to modify their pricing and marketing strategies. The sig-
nificant costs associated with defending against AD and CVD actions also
affected their business decisions. Canadian negotiators contended that
continuation of such a system would be incompatible with the goals of
the FTA and proposed that the two parties clarify what type of subsidies
would be appropriately actionable in the context of a free-trade relation-
ship.
Dave Resnicoff, The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement and the U.S. Con-
stitution: Does Article III allow Binational Panel Review of Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty Determinations?, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 246 (1990).
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been given the right to make a final determination of the
matters in dispute between the two countries in a relatively
short period of time without any judicial review. Apparently
each government felt that this system was more satisfactory
than the one which was replaced."7
Given the clear language of Article 1904 that the legal princi-
ples which would be applied by a court of the importing party
should be applied, the language specifying the standard of
review, and the legislative history cited above, statements such
as those by Justice Hart call into question whether there was a
meeting of the minds between the parties to the agreement
which resulted in Article 1904 of the CFTA and subsequently
NAFTA. It is clear that Congress thought it was establishing a
system which would decide cases as a court would in the U.S.
The conflict lies herein: if panels are to decide issues as would
a U.S. court, why are panels necessary when a U.S. court with
jurisdiction over the issues is in existence? If the governments
of Canada and Mexico felt they would receive a duplication of
Court of International Trade review, would they have been
pressed for inclusion of Article 19 in the CFTA and NAFTA?
2. No Appeal
If one solely considers the question of speed in reaching
finality, the fact that no review is generally available regard-
ing panel decisions can be seen as a benefit. If one chooses to
look any deeper than the simple issue of speed, however, the
elimination of routes to appeal is clearly troublesome.
As stated, no right to appeal exists with regard to matters
decided by the panels. A party dissatisfied with a panel deci-
sion has the opportunity to file a request for an extraordinary
challenge committee alleging the following:
a)i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross miscon-
duct, bias, or a serious conflict of interest, or otherwise mate-
rially violated the rules of conduct,
ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule
of procedure, or
37. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-
01 USA, at 28 (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding, August 3, 1994) (Hart,
J.).
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iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority
or jurisdiction set forth in this Article, and
b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has
materially affected the panel's decision and threatens the
integrity of the binational panel review process. 8
Thus, the agreements do not provide for review of allega-
tions of error.39 Participants to panel proceedings who are dis-
satisfied with the results of panel review must file a request
with the Office of the United States Trade Representative
alleging grounds for an ECC as indicated in the above lan-
guage. It is then within the discretion of the United States
Trade Representative whether to file a request for an ex-
traordinary challenge.4 ° Such a request cannot be filed by a
private party.4
Just how narrow the role played by an ECC was explained
in Live Swine:
The ECC should be perceived as a safety valve in those ex-
traordinary circumstances where a challenge is warranted to
maintain the integrity of the binational panel process. An
ECC corrects "aberrant panel decisions" and "aberrant
behaviour by panelists." The exceptional nature of an ex-
traordinary challenge was accentuated by the drafters of the
FTA by limiting extraordinary challenges to the United
States and Canadian governments, and not to other Partici-
pants in the panel's proceedings. The ECC should address
systemic problems and not mere legal issues that do not
threaten the integrity of the FTA's dispute mechanism itself.
A systemic problem arises whenever the binational panel
process itself is tainted by the failure on the part of a panel
38. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1904(13).
39. Pursuant to Rule 76 of the NAFTA Article 1904 Rules, participants to
panel review may file a motion within ten days after a panel issues its decision
requesting that the panel re-examine its decision in order to correct "an accidental
oversight, inaccuracy or omission." The grounds for the motion are limited to the
following: (a) that the decision does not accord with the reasons therefor; or (b)
that some matter has been accidentally overlooked, stated inaccurately or omitted
by the panel. Article 1904 Panel Rules, supra note 8, Rule 76, at 35.
40. Rules of Procedure for The North American Free Trade Agreement, Ex-
traordinary Challenge Committee Rules, Rule 37(1), NoRTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS-DISPUTE SETrLEMENT 17 (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch





or a panelist to follow their mandate under the FTA. (cita-
tions omitted)4
Thus, in virtually all cases, the decision of the panel is final
and dissatisfied participants to panel review have no right to
recourse. This degree of finality is particularly extraordinary
given the highly complex nature of the disputes which the
panels review, and the fact that two or three out of five panel-
ists upon whom this substantial responsibility rests will not be
United States lawyers.
3. Different Standards of Review
and Different Levels of Deference
Even in cases in which panel members cite to the applica-
ble United States standard of review, and make a good faith
effort to apply the proper standard and applicable precedent,
differences can arise in the manner in which the standard of
review would be applied as compared to a court and a panel
based upon the background of the panelists as trained in for-
eign legal systems or as "experts" in international trade. The
granting of a differing level of deference to the agency whose
action is the subject of review can, of course, have just as dra-
matic an impact on the outcome of a case.
a. Differing Canadian and Mexican Standards of Review
To an American lawyer practicing in the area of interna-
tional trade, the standards of review to be applied to review of
agency action on the record have been familiar since adminis-
trative law class in law school and have been a part of every
antidumping or countervailing duty opinion which we have
read, a part of every brief we have written and every oral ar-
gument in which we have participated. These standards, which
are so familiar to us, can appear completely alien and unfamil-
iar to a Canadian or Mexican lawyer or jurist.
The relevant standard of review for Canada is contained in
Section 28(1) of the Canadian Federal Court Act and is as
42. In re Live Swine from Canada, No. ECC-93-1904-01 USA, NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS-DISPUTE SETrLEMENT (James R. Holbein & Donald
J. Musch eds., Oceana Publications Booklet Series No. B.13C, Release 93-2, Nov.
1993) (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding, Apr. 8, 1993).
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follows:
Notwithstanding section 18 or the provisions of any other
Act, the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine an application to review and set aside a decision or
order, other than a decision or order of an administrative
nature not required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-
judicial basis, made by or in the course of proceedings before
a federal board, commission or other tribunal, on the ground
that the board, commission or tribunal:
(a) failed to observe a principle of natural justice or
otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) erred in law in making its decision or order, whether
or not the error appears on the face of the record; or
(c) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of
fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or with-
out regard for the material before it.4"
With regard to the Canadian standard of review, many
questions immediately spring to mind concerning, for instance,
the definition of the legal concepts "natural justice," 'judicial or
quasi-judicial basis," and "perverse or capricious manner."
Each of these concepts likely has a long line of precedent inter-
preting the precise meaning of the term. Further, specific rules
and traditions no doubt govern the manner in which such
interpretation is to take place."
Differences such as these occur between the United States
and Canada, two countries with common law traditions. An
American lawyer would be further at sea dealing with the
application of the standard of review in Mexico, a civil law
country. A reviewing court in Mexico would apply Article 238
of the Federal Tax Code, which would require it to overturn a
final antidumping or countervailing duty determination when:
(1) evidentiary defects exist in the relevant final deter-
43. Federal Court Act, R.S.C. ch. F-7, §28(1) (1985) (Can.).
44. For instance, the Canadian legal tradition does not take the same view of
the usefulness of legislative history as the United States legal tradition. An Ameri-
can lawyer might well turn to a committee or conference report to attempt to
determine what was meant by the term "natural justice." Judge Wilkey suggests
that the Canadian view of legislative history is quite different than the American
view. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01




mination, such as the absence of a reasoned explanation
based upon probative evidence contained in the administra-
tive record;
(2) the alleged facts cited by the competent Mexican
investigating authority did not occur (or the facts were other-
wise irrelevant or inapplicable to the legal standard); or
(3) the final SECOFI determination does not satisfy the
principles of congruency, logical development and concept and
reach between the arguments of the parties and the final
determination. 5
Where the above standard discusses "principles of congruency,
logical development and concept and reach between the argu-
ments of the parties and the final determination," the standard
betrays the fact that the differences between the United States
and Mexico with regard to such matters are not simple differ-
ences in the wording of the standard of review but differences
between entire legal systems as this language refers to meth-
ods of statutory interpretation used in a civil law system. In
fact, one commentator has suggested that "... . United States
and Mexican legal traditions (private law), constitutions (pub-
lic law), and political systems are so markedly different that
legal training and law practice in one country is more likely to
hinder rather than aid United States and Mexican lawyers in
understanding their neighbor's legal system."46
45. Craig R. Giesze, Mexico's New Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Sys-
tem: Policy and Legal Implications, as Well as Practical Business Risks and Reali-
ties, for United States Exporters to Mexico in the Era of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 855, 1020 n.568 (1994).
46. James F. Smith, Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican
Legal Systems in the Era of NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 85, 86-87 (1993).
This problem has also been the source of discussion specifically in the con-
text of NAFTA panels:
The final major problem area between Chapter Nineteen of the NAFTA
and the Mexican legal tradition relates to the Mexican standard of re-
view codified in Article 238 of the Federal Tax code. The plain language
of the Mexican standard of review notwithstanding, American and Cana-
dian panelists trained in the U.S. and Canadian common-law systems
may misinterpret certain clauses of this legal standard, because it is
grounded in civil-law principles, including civil-law rules of statutory
construction. Unless future American and Canadian NAFTA panelists
fully grasp the exact legal contours of Mexico's standard of review, these
individuals will be unable to perform effective panel review of final
SECOFI determinations.
Giesze, supra note 45, at 1036.
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While an American lawyer may come to a certain under-
standing and appreciation of the Canadian or Mexican stan-
dard of review through study, how much exposure would be
required before the American lawyer's competence in these
areas rose to that which would parallel that of a Canadian or
Mexican judge? Is it realistically possible to perform such a
feat for the purposes of participating in an ad hoc dispute
resolution tribunal? This seemingly impossible request is the
mirror image of what is, in effect, requested of those Canadian
or Mexican lawyers or jurists who serve on a NAFTA panel. If
the standard of review and principles of law are not applied by
such individuals in a manner as they would by a United States
court, this should come as no surprise.
b. International Trade Experts
Judge Wilkey suggested in his dissenting opinion in the
Softwood Lumber ECC that the background of panel members
who are not members of the judiciary but rather are interna-
tional trade experts may affect the deference which such panel
members are able to provide to agency decisions:
Psychologically, why should they be expected to show the
deference to administrative agency action which is required
as a fundamental tenet of U.S. judicial review of agency ac-
tion? The panel members are experts; they know better than
the lowly paid "experts" over in the Commerce Department,
and they have felt inclined to say so. Repeatedly, most vividly
in this particular case, they seem to have substituted their
judgment for that of the agency. They have not hesitated to
say that the agency was wrong on its methodology, wrong in
the choice of alternate economic analyses, wrong in its con-
clusions, and that the panel of five experts knows far better
how to do it. All of this of course is directly contrary to long-
standing United States law concepts of review of agency ac-
tion.47
Others have drawn similar conclusions; for example,
Smith has noted that "the binational panel of experts has not
been as deferential to administrative decisions as the Ameri-
47. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-




can courts given their considerable technical competence.48
Such comments have also been made in Canada:
Kazanjian, a Canadian trade lawyer argues that the Canadi-
an "federal court will generally defer" to administrative trade
authorities. He also argues that it is more likely that "both
the United States and Canadian panel members would take
their own expertise into account and could be less deferential
than the federal court to the expertise of the trade regula-
tors."49
Whether the effect cited occurs explicitly or even consciously or
not, an unwillingness to grant the same level of deference to
the agency as the court will result in differing results as surely
as the application of a different standard of review.
4. Divergent Body of Law
The potential for the development of a divergent body of
law developed and applied by the panels has existed since the
implementation of the CFTA. The likelihood that such a body
of divergent case law will develop has increased dramatically
with the addition of another country to the panel system under
NAFTA.
There are several ways in which divergent case law could
develop under the panel system. For instance, many
antidumping proceedings involve exports from multiple coun-
tries. If exports from Canada or Mexico are involved in such a
case and determinations regarding sales from those countries
are subject to panel review, it is possible that a panel would
reach a different result. Even with regard to issues common to
different exporters from the same country, if one opted for
panel review and another did not, differing law could govern
imports from the same countries.
Further, panels do cite to previous panel decisions. While
such decisions do not have the effect of precedent, panel mem-
bers may view previous panel decisions as persuasive on a
48. Smith, supra note 46, at 86 n.6 (citing Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from
Canada, No. USA 89-1904-06, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS-UNITED
STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: BiNATIoNAL PANEL REVIEWS (Oceana
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particular matter. A panel would be placed in a curious posi-
tion if a previous panel has spoken on an issue which the court
has not yet had the opportunity to address. Panels are also
placed in a difficult position when faced with issues upon
which there is disagreement on the court."
Finally, the mere fact that issues are being resolved by the
panels in a non-binding manner, rather than through the issu-
ance of judicial precedent, has a stunting effect on the develop-
ment of the law. The court is deprived of opportunities to settle
issues and to speak clearly in a precedential manner on mat-
ters which may be of concern to more parties than simply
those before the panel.
5. Constitutional Concerns
As the binational panel system has divested the Court of
International Trade, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit and the United States Supreme Court of jurisdiction to
review certain antidumping and countervailing duty determi-
nations, the system naturally has raised a number of constitu-
tional concerns.5' These concerns were serious enough to jus-
tify the addition of special statutory jurisdictional provisions
which deal with the manner in which constitutional challenges
are to be handled.
These substantive constitutional concerns were presented
to Congress by the Customs and International Trade Bar Asso-
ciation through its "Statement in Opposition to Withdrawal of
Jurisdiction in the United States Court of International Trade
and its Appellate Tribunals to Review Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty Decisions of Federal Agencies Involving Cana-
50. See Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment
from Canada, No. USA 89-1904-03 (Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding
Motions to Dismiss Reviews), NORTH AIERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS-UNITED
STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: BINATIONAL PANEL DECISIONS AND RE-
PORTS (Oceana Publications, Release 92-1, June 1992) (Mar. 7, 1990).
51. Parties in the United States are not alone in such concerns:
Specifically, a few Mexican legal scholars have suggested, based upon a
cold and strict parsing of the relevant provisions of the Mexican constitu-
tion - Articles 14 and 16, to be exact - that the Article 1904 dispute
resolution scheme may be unconstitutional. Consequently, the attempted
implementation of a future NAFTA binational panel decision by SECOFI
could trigger not only a Mexican constitutional challenge (judicio de
Amparo) but also an adverse ruling by the Mexican Supreme Court.
Giesze, supra note 45, at 1032-33.
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dian Merchandise" which was submitted during its consider-
ation of the CFTA. Subsequent to the establishment of the
CFTA panel system but prior to NAFTA, a suit was filed by
the National Council for Industrial Defense, Inc. (NCID) and
the American Engineering Association challenging the consti-
tutionality of the panel system which was dismissed on juris-
dictional grounds. Another case is currently pending which
challenges the decision of the Softwood Lumber ECC on con-
stitutional grounds. Finally, these issues have been the subject
of much speculation in various law journals.52
a. The Statutory Jurisdictional Provisions
The CFTA implementing legislation created a "fast-track"
procedure for constitutional challenges to the CFTA binational
panel system. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) such constitu-
tional challenges are to be heard by a three judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit." Decisions are appealable within ten days to the Su-
preme Court.54
Constitutional issues arising out of the underlying admin-
istrative determination are also provided for in § 1516a. Such
issues are to be heard by a three-judge panel of the CIT and
the party bringing the action is required to post security to
compensate the parties affected for any loss or damages in-
curred. The provision also entitles the prevailing party to the
award of fees, expenses, and costs in cases in which the consti-
tutionality of the system is upheld unless special circumstanc-
es make such award unjust.
Finally, an extraordinary statutory provision, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(g)(7), appears to take the benefit away from a party
which succeeds in such a constitutional challenge. This provi-
sion authorizes the President, on behalf of the United States,
52. Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 36; Peter Huston, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Dispute Settlement Under the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement: Is the Process Constitutional?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529, 546-49
(1990); Moyer, supra note 18; Gilad Y. Ohana, The Constitutionality of Chapter
Nineteen of the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Article III and the
Minimum Scope of Judicial Review, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 897 (1989); Resnicoff, su-
pra note 36.
53. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(g)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
54. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(g)(4)(H) (West Supp. 1994).
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to accept, as a whole, any decision of a binational panel or
ECC which has been declared unconstitutional and direct the
agency involved to take action consistent with the decision in
question after the President has accepted the decision." The
provision declares that the action of the President in accepting
the decision, and the actions of the agencies pursuant to such
direction, shall not be reviewable by any court of the United
States.
b. The CITBA Statement
The Customs and International Trade Bar Association
(CITBA) did not oppose the Free Trade Agreement with Cana-
da. CITBA did oppose, on both constitutional and policy
grounds, the establishment of the panel system which was
contained in the CFTA.5" The first constitutional concern
which CITBA raised was a potential conflict with Article III
Section one of the Constitution which provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judg-
es, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.57
CITBA interpreted this language as providing Congress
with the authority to define the jurisdiction of the federal
courts and the authority to withhold jurisdiction from them.
The judicial power of the United States, however, is vested in
"one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts" as Congress
may establish. If judicial power was to be vested at all, then,
55. In Executive Order 12,662 of December 31, 1988, the President accepted,
generally, such decisions:
In accordance with subsection 401(c) of the FTA Implementation Act, in
the event that the provisions of subparagraph 516A(g)(7)(B) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. section 1516a(g)(7)(B), take effect, I
accept, as a whole, all decisions of binational panels and extraordinary
challenge committees.
Exec. Order No. 12,662, 3 C.F.R. 624 (1989).
56. CITBA Statement, supra note 6.
57. Id. at 5; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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CITBA reasoned it must be vested with a federal court.58
Since binational panels are not courts, Congress exceeded its
authority in vesting judicial power in them.
CITBA also cited to a line of Supreme Court precedent
holding that international agreements must conform to the
Constitution and that it is impermissible for such agreements
to modify the basic character of the government.59 CITBA
stated that Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution place the
powers of government exclusively in the legislative, judicial,
and executive branches of government and that the CFTA
modified this alignment by vesting government power in the
panels.
CITBA also argued that the establishment of the panels
deprived individuals of "property" interests within the meaning
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. CITBA cited to Su-
preme Court authority holding that a cause of action has been
held to be "a species of property protected by the fourteenth
amendment's Due Process Clause,"0 and that while "the leg-
islature may elect not to confer a property interest ... it may
not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an inter-
est, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safe-
guards"6' and suggested that the denial of a hearing before a
court constituted a taking of an importer's property without
due process of law.
Finally, CITBA expressed equal protection concerns as to
the fourteenth amendment's guarantee implied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The potentially un-
equal nature of the panels was demonstrated with the follow-
ing example:
A simple illustration of this is as follows: A and B are both in
the business of importing product C. A imports product C
from Canada. B imports product C from France. If B has any
grievances over product C in reference to antidumping or
countervailing duties, he will be able to seek redress for his
58. CITBA Statement, supra note 6, at 5-6.
59. Id. at 3 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 620-21 (1871)).
60. Id. at 10 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (citing
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950))).
61. Id. at 11 (citing Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 490-91 n.6 (1980))).
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grievances in the Court of International Trade simply be-
cause he imported product C from France. Since A imported
product C from Canada, A will be precluded from asserting
any similar claims in the Court of International Trade. Ex-
cept for the origin of where they import product C from A
and B should be considered similarly situated.62
The House Judiciary Committee in the end concluded that
the CFTA was constitutional.63 The Committee determined,
with regard to Article III concerns, that because the CFTA was
the result of cooperation between the legislative and executive
branches the combination of the authority of these two branch-
es over the regulation of commerce and foreign affairs placed
the CFTA "on strong constitutional ground."" The Committee
stated that the rights removed from judicial review under the
CFTA were of a class of "public rights" which would be subject
to review by "an international body applying international
law."65 The Committee also stated that the panels would not
deprive any parties of due process based upon the following:
The panelists are charged with a duty to apply the law and
precedent of the relevant country. The panels will use the
basic rules of appellate procedure as they exist in the United
States and Canada, respectively. In addition, the panelists
will be subject to a strict code of ethics and will be subject to
peremptory challenges by each government. Finally, the FTA
provides for a review mechanism of aberrant panel decisions
through the use of extraordinary challenge committees. 6
With regard to Appointments Clause concerns, the Com-
mittee concluded that the Constitution did not prevent the
United States from participating in review of government ac-
tion by international tribunals and cited to the long history of
the use of such tribunals starting with the Jay Treaty of
1794.
62. Id. at 14 n.21.
63. Rodino, UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION
ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988).
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 15.
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c. National Council for Industrial Defense v. United States68
In March of 1992, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia heard arguments on behalf of the Nation-
al Council for Industrial Defense69 and the American Engi-
neering Association, Inc.7° challenging the binational panel
system.7 The complaint alleged that the President and Con-
gress had exceeded the authority granted to them under Arti-
cles I, II, and III of the Constitution by delegating judicial
powers to the binational panels."v The complaint also alleged
that the CFTA violated Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution
by vesting judicial powers of the United States in the panels
and alleged that the plaintiffs had been deprived of their Fifth
Amendment rights.
The complaint also alleged that the agreement violated the
Appointments Clause contained in Article II Section 2 of the
Constitution. This clause provides that the President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent also, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
ments.73
In Buckley v. Valeo,74 the Court held that all persons "exercis-
ing significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States" are officers of the United States.75
68. 827 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1993).
69. "[A] non-profit organization that fosters 'the strengthening of those endan-
gered American production facilities and work forces which contribute to the indus-
trial capacity of the United States.'" Id. at 796 (quoting Complaint at 1).
70. "[A] non-profit organization that works to 'enhance the status of the Amer-
ican engineering profession and related occupations and to support activities for
the employment of Americans in the engineering profession." Id. (quoting Com-
plaint at 2).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 797.
73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
74. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
75. National Council for Indus. Defense v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 794,
797 (D.D.C. 1993).
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The government filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the court lacked jurisdiction and the plaintiffs lacked
standing.76 As stated above, the CFTA implementing legis-
lation had placed jurisdiction for constitutional challenges to
the panel system in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.77 The subject case was filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging
alternative grounds for jurisdiction with the apparent goal of
avoiding the workings of Executive Order 12662, which would
be effective only if the binational panel provision was attacked
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.78
The court granted the government's motion to dismiss on juris-
dictional grounds and, thus, the case was not heard on the
merits.79
d. Coalition for Fair Lumber v. United States
On September 14, 1994 a case challenging the constitu-
tionality of the panel system was filed in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by the
Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports."0 This case, which is a
result of the Softwood Lumber panel and ECC decisions, chal-
lenges the implementation of those decisions on the grounds
that review by the panel and ECC violated the plaintiffs Fifth
Amendment Due Process rights and that the panel system vio-
lates the Appointments Clause and the separation of powers
requirements of Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution.8'
The complaint further alleges that the provision authorizing
the "acceptance" by the President of a decision declared uncon-
stitutional violates the due process requirement of the Fifth
Amendment and the Constitution's guarantees of equal protec-
tion.82
At the time of this writing, the government had not yet
filed an answer to the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports' com-
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. §1516a(g)(4)(A)).
78. Id. at 797-800.
79. Id. at 800.
80. Complaint and Petition for Review for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Coalition For Fair Lumber v. United States of America, No. 94-1627 (D.C. Cir.
filed Sept. 14, 1994).
81. Id. at 2-3.
82. Id. at 15, 16.
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plaint. It must be stated, however, that it appears that the
complaint places the government in an awkward position. By
defending this case, the government will be defending the
constitutionality of the dispute settlement mechanism which it
negotiated. The government will also be defending against an
attempt to overturn a panel decision which reversed the
government's administrative determination.
6. Ethical Considerations
The fact that the binational panels under the CFTA con-
sist exclusively of non-judges raises a number of potential
ethical problems. In order to deal with these problems a Code
of Conduct (Panel Code)"3 was established for panel members.
Particularly significant among the requirements of the
Code of Conduct are the requirements relating to "Responsi-
bility to the Process" and "Independence and Impartiality,"
which are as follows:
I. RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PROCESS
A candidate or member shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety and shall observe high standards
of conduct so that the integrity, fairness, and independence of
the dispute settlement process will be preserved.
II. INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY
A member shall be independent and impartial. A mem-
ber shall act in a fair manner and avoid the appearance of
partiality.
A member shall not be influenced by self-interest, out-
side pressure, public clamor, loyalty to a Party, or fear of
criticism.
A member shall not incur any obligation or accept a
benefit of any kind, directly or indirectly, which would in any
way interfere or appear to interfere with the proper discharge
of the member's functions.
While sitting on a panel or committee, a member shall
not use the power of membership to advance any personal or
private interests. A member shall not act in a manner that
83. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Code of Conduct for Proceed-
ings Under Chapter 18 & 19, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS-TREATY
MATERIALS (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds., Oceana Publications Book-
let A.5, Release 93-2, Nov. 1993).
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would create the impression that others are in a special posi-
tion to influence the member. A member should make every
effort to prevent or discourage others from presenting them-
selves as being in such a position.
A member shall not allow past or existing financial,
business, professional, family or social relationships or re-
sponsibilities to influence the member's conduct or judge-
ment. A member shall avoid entering into any such relation-
ship, or acquiring any financial or personal interest, that is
likely to affect the member's impartiality or that might rea-
sonably create the appearance of bias. For a period of one
year after completion of a Chapter 19 proceeding, a former
member shall not personally advise or represent any partici-
pant in the proceeding with regard to antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty matters. A former member shall otherwise
avoid impropriety or actions that may reasonably give the
appearance that the member was biased in his or her func-
tions as a member by the expectation of benefiting therefrom.
In the case of a proceeding conducted under Article 1904,
a member or former member shall not represent a participant
either in a domestic court proceeding involving the same
goods from third countries whose imports were cumulated
with those from a Party for the purpose of an injury determi-
nation or any court proceeding attempting to challenge the
proceeding.'
The Code specifically states that "The governing principle
of this Code is that a candidate or member must disclose the
existence of any interests or relationships that are likely to
affect the candidate's or member's independence and impartial-
ity or that might reasonably create the appearance of bias."
85
Thus, in order for the code to be effective it is incumbent on
panel members and potential panel members to fully disclose
the matters touching upon the above quoted Code language.
The Code does not place the same demands on panel mem-
bers as the ABA Model Code of Judicial Ethics (Judicial
Code)85 places upon members of the judiciary. The language of
the Panel Code is simply not as exacting as the language of the
Judicial Code. Compare, for instance, the Panel Code language
quoted above under "I. Responsibility to the Process" to Canon
84. Id. at 1-2.
85. Id. at 2.
86. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
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1 and Canon 2 of the Judicial Code: "A Judge shall uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary. A Judge shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
the Judge's activities."87 While the Panel Code states that the
panel member shall "avoid impropriety," the Judicial Code
places an affirmative duty on the judge to uphold the integrity
of the judiciary and mandates that the judge shall avoid im-
propriety and the appearance of impropriety not only with
regard to the matters before the judge in court but in all of the
judge's activities.
Canon 4 of the Judicial Code is as follows: "A Judge shall
so conduct the Judge's extrajudicial activities as to minimize
the risk of conflict with judicial obligations."8 It would be vir-
tually impossible for the Panel Code to contain a provision
analogous to Canon 4 as the nature of the system presumes
that panel members will be engaged in the practice of interna-
tional trade law and, thus, will be conducting their affairs
outside of their panel activities in such a manner as will maxi-
mize the risk of conflicts with potential panel obligations. Pan-
elists engage in the practice of international trade law both
before and after their involvement as panelists. Given the
repetitive nature of many issues which arise in the context of
antidumping and countervailing duty disputes, it is possible
that panelists could find themselves deciding issues with which
they have had involvement in private practice or with which
they will one day have involvement in private practice.
Further, the panel system places panel members in the
position of reviewing decisions of an agency before which they
may practice. A panelist may review a decision made by an
analyst at the ITA and then later represent a party before the
same analyst. It is even possible that, in such a situation, the
same issues would arise as those which were the subject of the
panel dispute, since by their terms panel decisions are binding
only upon the parties before the panel.
The possibilities for such occurrences, which may or may
not violate the Panel Code, certainly complicate the relation-
ships between the parties to such disputes and tend to in-
crease, rather than decrease, the possibility of ethical problems
87. Id.
88. Id. Canon 4.
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arising.
These concerns may diminish somewhat under NAFTA.
Annex 1901.2 of NAFTA provides that binational panels "shall
include judges and former judges to the fullest extent prac-
ticable." 9 The potential for problems to arise, however, will
not disappear unless the panels are wholly drawn from the
judiciary."
The potential for problems is illustrated by the Softwood
Lumber case. Two panel members in that case were subject to
allegations of conflicts of interests after the issuance of the
panel determination. The professional relationships which
were the basis of the alleged conflicts had not been disclosed
by the panelists involved. In its brief before the ECC reviewing
the matter, the government described the importance of the
issue as follows:
More than anything else, faith in the integrity and indepen-
dence of panelist is the key to the perceived legitimacy of the
binational panel process. In light of this reality, the United
States and Canada developed a Code of Conduct containing
strict-and continuing-requirements that panelists and po-
tential panelists disclose all business and professional rela-
tionships with parties having an interest in the proceedings.
This system of self-disclosure is effectively the only means for
the Parties to become aware of and, if necessary, take correc-
tive action concerning panelist conduct that weakens the
legitimacy of the system. In addition to disclosure, the Code
also requires the panelist affirmatively to avoid relationships
that could suggest even the appearance of impropriety or
bias. Judges in both the United States and Canada are sub-
ject to essentially the same requirement, and its importance
to the safeguarding of confidence in the panel system is obvi-
ous.
By maintaining relationships that create the appearance
of partiality, and in one case, that constitutes a serious con-
flict of interest, and by failing to disclose these relationships
to the Parties for their consideration, two of the panelists in
this case failed in substantial respects to comply with their
obligations under the Code. Even more importantly for the
Chapter 19 system of dispute resolution, these failings effec-
89. NAFTA, supra note 5, annex 1901.2.
90. To do so would, again, cause an observer to ask if the panels are to be
drawn entirely from the judiciary, are such panels necessary?
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tively taint the decision reached by the panel such that inter-
vention by this Committee under the standards of Article
1904 is imperative. These failings represent the kind of aber-
rant behavior by panelists that the ECC process is intended
to address.9'
In his dissent to the Softwood Lumber ECC decision,
Judge Malcolm Wilkey described the conflicts of the two pan-
elists. Judge Wilkey determined that the first panelist failed to
disclose the following:
1. Legal services he personally provided to an agency of
the Canadian Government, one of the two parties in this
proceeding, during the course of this proceeding itself;
2. His law firm's relationships with eleven Canadian
lumber and forest product companies continuing during the
proceedings in this case; and
3. His and his firm's relationships with the Canadian
Government during the course of these proceedings.92
Judge Wilkey stated that the second panelist involved
violated the Code by failing to disclose:
1. His firms' financial interests and relationships with
the Governments of Canada, Ontario, British Columbia and
the Government of the United States, all of which were par-
ties to the panel proceedings;
2. His and his law firms' existing and past relationships
with three Canadian lumber and forest product companies;
3. His firms' relationship with Miranda Inc. and Georgia
Pacific, both interested in the lumber panel proceeding.
93
Despite the apparent conflicts, the ECC determined that there
was "no intentional refusal to reveal any matter that would
justify the opposite party in removing either panelist and the
request by the United States government for an extraordinary
challenge should be rejected."
91. Brief filed on May 3, 1994 by the Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative at 21-22, In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No.
ECC-94-1904-01 USA, (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding, Aug. 3, 1994).
92. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-
01 USA, at 77 (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding, Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey,
J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 79.
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On the basis of this decision it appears as though panelists
are being held to even lower ethical standards than arbitra-
tors. In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co.,94 the Supreme Court examined a case in which an arbi-
trator had failed to disclose that one of his customers was a
party to the arbitration proceedings. The Court reversed a
decision upholding the arbitrator's decision stating that "any
tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not
only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appear-
ance of bias."95 The Court emphasized the importance of dis-
closure given the fact that arbitral decisions, like panel deci-
sions, are not subject to appellate review:
it is true that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the
business world, since they are not expected to get all their
income from their work deciding cases, but we should, if any-
thing, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality
of arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely
free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not
subject to appellate review. We can perceive no way in which
the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered
by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the
parties any dealings that might create an impression of pos-
sible bias.96
Based upon this rule, arbitral decisions have been over-
turned in cases in which an arbitrator has represented a party
to the arbitration proceeding,97 or where the law firm with
which an arbitrator practiced has represented a party to the
arbitral proceeding, even when that representation was stated
to have been unknown to the arbitrator at the time of the
proceedings." Similarly, a Justice of the Peace who is acting
as an attorney for one of the parties to the proceedings must
be disqualified.99
Thus, courts have held those who sit in place of judges,
such as arbitrators and justices of the peace, to an ethical
standard at least as high, if not higher, than that applied to
94. 393 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1968).
95. Id. at 150.
96. Id. at 149.
97. Bole v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 379 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1977).
98. Close v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
99. Chicago & A.R. v. Summers, 14 N.E. 733 (Ind. 1887).
558 [Vol. XX:3
BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW
the judges themselves. Members of Article 1904 panels should
not be exceptions to this rule.
7. Public Confidence
Both members of the majority in Softwood Lumber ECC
emphasized the fragility of public confidence in the binational
panel system in the course of reaching a decision which they
apparently anticipated would be controversial.
The inherent weakness in the panel system, if such
there be, is the difficultly of inculcating in the minds of inter-
ested parties and other members of the general public the
same confidence in the impartiality of panel members as they
have in the judiciary."®
It is unfortunate that the decision in this matter has not
been unanimous because there is always a chance that it will
be interpreted as a decision based on national interest when
the two Canadian members of the Committee form a majority
and the American member files a dissent.''
As a result of the Softwood Lumber decision the binational
panel system is now undergoing its second constitutional chal-
lenge. A number of members of Congress have written to the
President asking that the decision not be implemented, and
questions linger about the ethical concerns raised by such
panels, why such panels are necessary, and whether they are
performing adequately. The fact that this topic is, once again,
being discussed at this judicial conference indicates that these
questions have not been resolved in the minds of many but,
rather, are very much alive. At this late date, after the inclu-
sion of Mexico in the binational panel system, the fact that
these questions are still unresolved indicates a low level of
confidence in the system.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Serious Consideration Should be Given to Eliminating the
Panels
100. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-
01 USA, at 29 (Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Proceeding Aug. 3, 1994) (Morgan,
J.).
101. Id. at 53-54 (Hart, J.).
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The authors share the opinion that the binational panel
system set up to review antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations is not an effective substitute for national judi-
cial review. From a business point of view, the outcome of
panel review offers far less certainty or predictability than
determinations by the national courts. The reasons for this are
several. A review of panel determinations indicates that panels
have varied widely over the standard and scope of adminis-
trative review. Moreover, panelists tend to substitute their
judgment for the judgment of the administrative agency in
establishing a determination. To do so in a United States case
is clearly contrary to statute and judicial authority. Further,
the fact that decisions issued by the panels are not
precedential adds greatly to this lack of predictability.
It must also be noted that Congress established the CIT as
a court of specialized jurisdiction in order that litigants would
have the benefit of a specialized bench expert in review of the
very issues which the panels review. Removal of jurisdiction
from the CIT is inconsistent with the original concept of estab-
lishment of such a court with special subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
The concept of deference to administrative authority,
which exists not only in the United States but also in different
forms and degrees in Canada and Mexico, has not been uni-
formly applied by the panelists over the past five years. Fur-
ther, the lack of an appeal of right is often frustrating to a
business appearing before a panel either as a domestic inter-
ested party or a respondent. There may be a lack of ability to
have an opinion of the panel clarified, in terms of basis for
determination, or reviewed by a higher authority or even serve
as legal precedent for the future. Also, there is no right to an
appeal. In fact, in those few cases where an ECC has been
established by a determination of the United States Trade
Representative, only those cases that have been politically elec-
tric have made it to that level. Other cases, which are inher-
ently less dramatic or less newsworthy, involving petitioners
and respondents with only limited financial resources, must
accept the determination of three individuals. These persons
may carry unidentifiable biases induced by years of "going to
battle" on behalf of private parties before the same agency that
issued the determination they are expected to now rule upon




As mentioned previously, a private party who does not
agree with a panel result ordinarily is not even in a position to
challenge the constitutionality of any aspect of the proceeding
or the panel itself. The United States implementing legislation
requires that a litigant who challenges the constitutionality of
the panel system and loses must bear the entire costs of the
government in defending the matter. We are aware of no other
legislation that sets up such a potential obstacle to a constitu-
tional challenge. No normal business, responsible to sharehold-
ers, would likely engage in a constitutional challenge under
those conditions and, to that extent, the device inserted by the
drafters of the implementing legislation has been successful. A
current challenge, brought about by a trade association, may
have some success, assuming the association has standing to
bring the action in view of this legislative requirement.
United States manufacturers, labor unions, importers and
distributors who are a party to an antidumping or countervail-
ing duty proceeding have lost the constitutional right to have
impartial judicial review of a determination of which they are
aggrieved. Moreover, they have lost the right to an appeal.
These are fundamental rights that should not be subservient to
the agency's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
B. If the Binational Panel System is to Continue, Improve-
ments in the System Should Be Made
On the assumption that, as a practical matter, the panels
will continue to be involved in adjudicating trade disputes
within their jurisdiction as between the United States, Cana-
da, and Mexico, and recognizing the possibility that such bina-
tional panel review may extend to numerous other countries,
the following observations are in order.
1. The negotiators, and our Congress, should consider
removing all impediments to constitutional challenge. The
extraordinary imposition of ominous and unknown costs, as
imposed by United States law, is pernicious and contrary to
the Constitution itself.
2. Congress should consider limiting panel membership to
102. The authors readily acknowledge that the roll of panelists include out-
standing members of the bar.
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judges or retired judges either from the federal or state sys-
tems. Judges understand and adhere to the strict code of judi-
cial conduct which governs their lives and guarantees fair and
impartial judication. There is no legitimate reason why issues
of law and fact arising out of antidumping and countervailing
duty matters reviewed by a panel should not be reviewed by
individuals who already have the public trust by reason of
their judicial position. International trade attorneys appearing
before the agency as counsel for private parties and also serv-
ing as panelists in other simultaneous cases represent an in-
herent opportunity for bias.
3. Moreover, the current code of ethics utilized in the bina-
tional panel system is inadequate, as demonstrated by the
serious questions left behind in the Softwood Lumber case.
Instead, an entirely new set of ethics should be drafted based
fully on the judicial canons. The code should specifically deal
with the professional consequences and the disposition of cases
where a panelist is found to have breached the code.
4. Another possibility is to establish a core of full time
panel members consisting of persons who are capable of carry-
ing on judicative activities but who are prohibited from appear-
ing before any United States or foreign government agency
that deals with trade in order to guarantee impartiality.
5. New legislation or a new agreement should be adopted
to provide for an absolute right to appeal thus giving interest-
ed parties an opportunity to have an impartial review of a
panel decision. A panel would be more inclined to adhere to
the scope and standards of review knowing that appeal could,
for example, be made directly to a court of appeals such as the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
In the final analysis, the Canadian and United States, and
most recently Mexican, governments have established systems
of panel review that have substantial imperfections. Most sig-
nificantly, the panels in the United States do not afford private
businesses with sufficient protections to guarantee due process
in the disposition of the respective business interests relating
to the application of the antidumping and countervailing duty
laws. Therefore, we suggest that the Congress and the trade
negotiators consider the elimination of the panel system or, at
the very least, require judicial standards of selection and ethics
for panelists.
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